May Bigler v. Industrial Commission of Utah, T.W. Services and Transportation Insurance Co. : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
May Bigler v. Industrial Commission of Utah, T.W.
Services and Transportation Insurance Co. : Brief of
Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael E. Dyer; Blackburn & Stoll; Attorney for Respondents.
Phillip B. Shell; Day & Barney; Attorneys for Petitioner.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, State of Utah v. T.W. Services and Transportation Insurance Co., No. 950838 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/7067
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BftiEF 
UTA!-' 
L»- "w> V - ». •> • " « • 
KFU 
50 
DOCKET NO. q S Q f t 9 ^ 4 ^ 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
MAY BIGLER, 
Applicant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
T.W. SERVICES, INC., and 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case: 950838-CA 
Priority Classification 7 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER MAY BIGLER 
Petition for Review of an Order of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah 
The Honorable Barbara A. Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
MICHAEL E. DYER 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
77 West 200 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondents 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
PHILLIP B. SHELL 
DAY & BARNEY 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
FAILED 
APR - 3 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
MAY BIGLER, 
Applicant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
Case: 950838-CA 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, Priority Classification 7 
T.W. SERVICES, INC., and 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER MAY BIGLER 
Petition for Review of an Order of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah 
The Honorable Barbara A. Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
MICHAEL E. DYER PHILLIP B. SHELL 
BLACKBURN & STOLL DAY & BARNEY 
77 West 200 South, #400 45 East Vine Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Respondents Attorneys for Petitioner 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents i 
Table of Authorities ii 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of Issues on Appeal 1 
Determinative Statutes and Rules 2 
Statement of the Case 
Procedural History 2 
Factual History 3 
Summary of Argument 5 
Argument 6 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY 
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED THE LAW RELATIVE 
TO THE HIGHER STANDARD OF CAUSATION 
UNDER ALLEN V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Conclusion 9 
Mailing Certificate 11 
Addendum 12 
1. Interim findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
2. Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
3. Order Granting Motion for Review 
TABLE OF AUTHORITffiS 
CASES 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 
King v. Industrial Commission, 
850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993) 1,2 
Smith & Edwards Co. v. Industrial Commission. 
770 P.2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989) 9 
Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 
801 P.2d 179 (Utah App. 1990) 7,9 
STATUTES 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(c), U.C.A 1 
Section 35-1-86, U.C.A. (1988) 1 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
MAY BIGLER, 
Applicant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
: Case: 950838-CA 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, Priority Classification 7 
T.W. SERVICES, INC., and 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER MAY BIGLER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-86 
(1988) as this is an appeal from a final Order of the Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the Industrial Commission improperly interpreted and applied the law 
relative to the higher standard of causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) in light of the uncontested facts of the Applicant's injury. 
The standard of review is correction of error in erroneous interpretation or 
application of the law. Section 63-46b-16(4)(c), U.C. A. and King v. Industrial 
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App. 1993). There is no specific or implied grant of 
discretion to the Industrial Commission in the interpretation of the law. See King, id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
We are not aware of any statutes or rules that are determinative in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
May Bigler filed an application for hearing with the Industrial Commission on 
March 24, 1994, seeking compensation and benefits for a low back injury that occurred 
at work on March 11, 1993 (R. at 4). 
Mrs. Bigler fs claim was heard before an Administrative Law Judge of the 
Industrial Commission on August 8, 1994. The ALJ issued Interim Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on August 17, 1994. In this order, the ALJ found and 
concluded that Mrs. Bigler had met her burden of legal causation (R. at 21-30). As a 
result, the matter was referred to a medical panel appointed by the Industrial 
Commission to consider the contested medical issues of the claim (R. at 32-34). Soon 
thereafter, the medical panel met with the Petitioner and issued a report (R. at 35-44). 
The resulting report of the medical panel was circulated to the parties on December 22, 
1994 (R. at 45). Timely objections to the medical panel's report were filed by the 
Defendants' counsel but no hearing was requested thereon (R. at 48-83). Thereafter on 
2 
March 24, 1995 the ALJ issued her final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order. This Order awarded benefits to Mrs. Bigler (R. at 93-101). 
Following the grant of an extension of time, the Defendants filed a timely 
Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on May 26, 1995 and the Petitioner 
responded on June 12, 1995 (R. at 105-169). The Order Granting Motion for Review 
was issued by the Commissioners of the Industrial Commission on September 29, 1995 
(R. at 170-173). This order denied the Petitioner's claim by concluding that Mrs. 
Bigler's actions resulting in her injury did not meet the higher causational standard 
required by Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) of a person with 
a pre-existing back condition. 
The Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration on October 18, 1995 
(R. at 174-177). An Order Extending Time for Reconsideration allowing the Industrial 
Commission until December 8, 1995 to issue a decision was entered on November 3, 
1995 (R. at 183-185). The Industrial Commission's Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration was issued on December 7, 1995 (R. at 186-188). 
The Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Review with this Court on December 
29, 1995. 
Factual History 
1. Petitioner May Bigler was employed as a cashier with Respondent TW 
Services as of March 11, 1993. The company provides an on-site lunch room/cafeteria 
for employees at Discover Card. Mrs. Bigler was working about 35 hours a week at 
the time and had been with the Defendant for about a year. (R. at 415-416). 
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2. On March 11, 1993, Mrs. Bigler was standing next to her cash register 
in the lunch room and was talking with her supervisor who was on the other side of the 
counter. Her work station consisted of a cash register on a waist high counter situated 
between two long counters of similar height that ran behind it. These counters allowed 
patrons on either side to slide their lunch trays toward the cash register to pay for their 
food (R. at 380-382, 417). The counter was about 2 1/2 feet across (R. at 381). Mrs. 
Bigler was situated somewhat to her left of the cash register. (R. at 440-441). To her 
right on the opposite side of the counter on which the cash register sat was a glass menu 
board holding an 8" x 11" piece of paper advertising cafeteria specials (R. at 417-418, 
401). 
3. At one point in her conversation with her supervisor, Mrs. Bigler 
noticed that the menu board was starting to fall forward to the floor. Without thinking 
she made a sudden lunge from the left to the right across the counter to attempt to catch 
the falling board with her right hand (R. at 418-419, 440-441). She was unable to do 
so and the glass in the board shattered on the floor (R. at 401). The force of the sudden 
dive for the board resulted in her falling on the counter with one of her feet off the 
floor (R. at 419). She felt immediate sharp pain in her lower back with pain and 
numbness radiating into her left leg (R. at 420). This sudden jerk for the menu board 
involved twisting the waist about 25° to the right while quickly lunging forward across 
the counter to the right, this resulted in her falling up against the counter at which point 
there was the immediate onset of pain (R. at 419). 
4. Mrs. Bigler's medical history shows evidence of preexisting degenerative 
disk disease in the lumbar and thoracic spine, among other things (R. at 269). The 
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parties do not dispute the existence of her preexisting conditions. At the time of the 
incident in question, the Petitioner was 56 years old, stood 5'6" tall and weighed 160 
lbs (R. at 37). Before entering the work force in about 1991 or 1992 she had been a 
homemaker during her adult life. Defendant TW Services was her first employer (R. at 
361). 
5. The medical panel doctors who examined Mrs. Bigler at the request of 
the ALJ concluded that a medically demonstrable causal relationship exists between her 
back problems and the March 11, 1993 industrial injury. They determined a period of 
temporary total disability from the date of the accident in March of 1993 to April of 
1994. She was given a 5% impairment rating for her low back with 1/3 of it due to the 
industrial accident. She was also given a 5 % impairment rating for a somataform pain 
disorder due to the industrial accident. (R. at 35-44). The findings of the medical panel 
were adopted by the A.L.J, in her findings of fact (R. at 96). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission used too restrictive of an analysis in interpreting and 
applying the law of the Allen case to the circumstances of Mrs. Bigler's claim. The 
intensity or violence of the act or exertion that resulted in injury is critical in 
considering whether the act meets the higher standard of legal causation required of 
someone with a preexisting condition. The facts, as adopted by the Industrial 
Commission lead to the conclusion that Mrs. Bigler did meet her burden of establishing 
legal causation. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission Improperly 
Interpreted and Applied the Law Relative to the Higher Standard 
of Causation under Allen v. Industrial Commission 
Upon the Respondents' Motion for Review, the Commissioners of the Industrial 
Commission reversed the order of the A.L.J, and ruled that Mrs. Bigler's accident was 
not compensable. Their rationale was that her actions did not meet the higher exertion 
standards required by the Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), 
decision This overruled the conclusions of the A.L.J, that the Petitioner's exertions did 
meet the higher standard. 
To meet the legal causation requirement, the Allen decision requires a claimant 
with a pre-existing condition to "show that the employment contributed something 
substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition." Allen. 729 P.2d at 25. 
This requirement helps to distinguish between injuries which 
(a) coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition 
results in symptoms which appear during work hours without any 
enhancement from the workplace, and (b) those injuries which occur 
because some condition or exertion of employment increases the risk of 
injury which the worker normally faces in everyday life. 
Allen, id. 
The Court in Allen recognized that the issue must be determined on the facts of 
each case. Allen at 25. The facts are not in dispute here. The Commissioners adopted 
the factual findings of the A.L.J, in their Order Granting Motion for Review (R. at 
171). 
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We submit that the law was improperly applied by the Commissioners to the 
facts of this case. Their interpretation of Allen is unnecessarily restrictive and not in 
line with the meaning and intent of the law. 
As stated in Allen, "[T]he key question in determining causation is whether 
given this body and this exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to the injury." 
Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 801 P.2d 179 (Utah App. 1990), 
quoting from Allen at 24. 
The A.LJ. made the following factual findings relative to the exertions in 
question: 
The applicant testified that she was standing in front of the 
register and somewhat to the left of it when she noticed the menu start to 
fall off the counter on the other side of the register. The Applicant 
stated that she twisted suddenly to the right and lunged forward to try to 
catch the falling menu. As she did so, she needed to reach across the 
end of the counter on the right side of the register with her right hand. 
The applicant stated that this action was done very suddenly in an 
attempt to catch the falling menu. She was unable to catch the menu, but 
felt a sharp pain in her low back at approximately the belt line as she 
lunged and reached at the same time... 
(R. at 23). 
The record shows further that she fell across the counter to her right side (R. at 
441). As she made this sudden jerk or lung, the Petitioner testified that her right foot 
went off the floor as well (R. at 419). There is no dispute that her movements to 
attempt to catch the falling board were very quick and sudden. The A.L.J, found this 
to be a high-energy activity. 
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We submit that the quality or intensity or violence of the action resulting in 
injury can be critical to the determination of whether the higher standard for 
establishing legal causation is met. 
The evidence in the record before the Industrial Commission shows this to have 
been a high energy event. It was not a casual twist or reach. Mrs. Bigler quickly dove 
diagonally across the counter in a vain attempt to catch the falling menu frame which 
then shattered on the floor. It was a sudden twisting lunge at an angle across a waist 
high counter top. 
The quality or intensity of the activity involved with this person and this body 
resulted in a low back injury. What Mrs. Bigler did was severe enough to meet the 
higher standard. We submit that it was beyond usual exertions of normal non 
employment life because of the force or violence of the event. 
The Defendants submitted reports from their doctors, as well as from an 
ergonomics specialist, in an attempt to show that the Petitioner's exertion did not reach 
that of the type of activities mentioned in Allen which are commonly considered to be 
typical non employment activities in late 20th Century life.1 However, HOW those 
activities are performed has a major difference in the stress and exertion placed upon 
the body. While a person with a preexisting low back condition who merely lifts a 
small child to chest height and feels a sudden sharp low back pain may not have 
sustained a legally compensable industrial accident as a result, the outcome could be 
lrThe Allen case mentions such things as lifting a small child to chest height, changing a flat tire on a car, 
climbing stairs in buildings, and taking full garbage cans to the street. 
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entirely different if he, while lifting the child, or something of similar weight, has to 
move suddenly in a jerking twisting movement while holding that weight. 
Again, it is the quality or violence of the act that is the pivotal factor. The 
intensity of the act is what brings the element of risk of injury to the job. As stated in 
the Stouffer case, "The usualness or unusualness of a claimant's exertion must be 
determined in its actual context." Stouffer at 183. This court has rejected the notion 
that the ususalness or unusualness of an activity must be judged by a bright line test, 
whether it be for weight or the just the general description of an activity. Smith & 
Edwards Co. v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 1016 (Utah App. 1989). 
What happened to Mrs. Bigler at work is clearly within the type of injuries 
which Allen and its progeny intended to be the ones that should meet the legal standard 
of unusual or extraordinary exertion. The facts and circumstances of this case show 
that the injury Mrs. Bigler sustained did not just comcidentally occur at work, but was 
brought on by exertion required by the circumstances of her employment which 
increased the risk of injury which a worker would otherwise normally face in life. See 
Allen at 25. 
The Industrial Commission improperly applied the Allen standard in this matter. 
The Industrial Commission's order should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Bigler has met her burden of establishing legal causation under the higher 
standard required by the Allen decision. The Industrial Commission has taken a too 
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restrictive interpretation of the Allen decision. The order of the Industrial Commission 
should be reversed because of its improper interpretation and application of the law. 
Dated t h i s j ^ day o f APril> 199J^ 
fillip B. Shell 
Day & Barney 
Attorneys for Petitioner May Bigler 
10 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed, 
first class, postage prepaid on this 2^< day of April, 1996, to the following counsel of 
record: 
MICHAEL E. DYER 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
77 West 200 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
lillip B. Shell 
Day & Barney 
11 
ADDENDUM 
1. Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
2. Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
3. Order Granting Motion for Review 
12 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 94-273 
MAY BIGLER, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
TW SERVICES/TRANSPORTATION 
INSURANCE, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ic 
* 
ic 
ic 
ic 
* 
INTERIM 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ORDER 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 
8, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by 
Phillip Shell, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for temporary total compensation 
(TTC) and medical expenses related to a March 11, 1993 industrial 
back injury. The defendants paid initial diagnostic expenses 
following the March 11, 1993 injury, but currently deny all 
liability for that injury. The defendants take the position that 
the applicant did not sustain a compensable industrial accident on 
March 11, 1993. The primary reason argued by the defendants for 
the assertion of non-compensability is that the applicant cannot 
establish legal cause related to that incident. Per the holding in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), legal 
cause is one of the two required elements of compensability. The 
defendants argue that, in order to establish legal cause in this 
case, the applicant must be able show that the incident on March 
11, 1993 involved exertion beyond what is experienced by 20th 
century individuals in their daily non-employment lives (ala 
Allen). The defendants argue that this standard applies to this 
case because the applicant has a contributory pre-exsiting 
condition. Per the defendants, the incident on March 11, 1993 did 
not involve any kind of unusual exertion and thus legal cause and 
compensability are not established. The defendants rely in part on 
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the opinions of Dr. T. Grange and Dr. D. Bloswick for the 
proposition that the applicant's exertion on March 11, 1994 was 
less than is required by the ruling in the Allen case. 
The applicant concedes that she had a contributory pre-
existing back condition on March 11, 1993 and that she therefore 
must show "unusual" exertion in order to establish the legal cause 
requirement for compensability. The applicant argues that her 
exertion on March 11, 1993 does meet the unusual exertion 
requirement specified in Allen. Counsel for the applicant argued 
at hearing that the opinions of Dr. Grange and Dr. Bloswick are 
based on inaccurate facts regarding the nature of the applicant's 
activity on March 11, 1993. As such, counsel finds the Grange and 
Bloswick opinions to be irrelevant to the legal cause 
determination. 
At hearing, the ALJ indicated that she would make a ruling 
on the threshold issue of compensability before she dealt with any 
other issues that need to be resolved. The ALJ indicated that she 
would first review the medical record exhibit submitted at hearing. 
The ALJ indicated that she was not clear at hearing on whether or 
not the other element of compensability, i.e. medical cause, was 
also controverted. She indicated that if legal cause was 
established, she might feel the need to refer the matter to a 
medical panel in order to get additional input on the other element 
of compensability, i. e. medical cause. After reviewing the 
medical records, the ALJ makes the following factual findings. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a female who was 56 years old on the date 
of injury, March 11, 1993, with no dependents at that time. The 
applicant was employed as a cashier with TW Services on March 11, 
1993, making $5.20 per hour and working 35 hours per week. 
Although the applicant's current claim is with respect to the March 
11, 1993 incident, the applicant did have another back incident a 
year prior to her injury on March 11, 1993. On or about March 13, 
1992, while at work for TW Services, the applicant was lifting a 
tray of silverware/utensils which weighed approximately 10 pounds. 
The applicant experienced back pain at that time and went to see 
her then family doctor, Dr. Johnson. The applicant recalls that he 
prescribed some muscle relaxers for her and other medical records 
indicate that the applicant returned to work immediately. Per the 
other records, the pain eased after about a month and the applicant 
had no other back concerns until the March 11, 1993 incident. 
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On the date of injury currently at issue, March 11, 1993, 
the applicant was at work standing in front of her cash register. 
The applicant's work station consisted of a cash register situated 
in between two waist-high counters that ran from the register back 
towards the applicant, continuing on behind her. The counters 
allowed individuals to stand in line and set their cafeteria trays 
on the counters, sliding them along until they reached the front of 
the line where they paid the applicant for their food. The 
applicant stood in front of the register and had a counter running 
along either side of her. On the opposite side of the register 
from the applicant, and off to the right of the applicant, there 
was an 8" x 11" sheet of paper with the daily menu on it, inserted 
into a plastic stand. The applicant testified that she was 
standing in front of the register and somewhat to the left of it 
when she noticed the menu start to fall off the counter on the 
other side of the register. The applicant stated that she twisted 
suddenly to the right and lunged forward to try to catch the 
falling menu. As she did so, she needed to reach across the end of 
the counter on the right side of the register with her right hand* 
The applicant stated that this action was done very suddenly in an 
attempt to catch the falling menu. She was unable to catch the 
menu, but felt 3 sharp pain in her low back at approximately the 
belt line as she lunged and reached at the same time. The 
applicant stated that she had left leg symptoms (pain and then 
numbness and tingling) at about the same time. 
The applicant was seen at St. Mark's Hospital on March 11, 
1993 and was diagnosed with a lumbar strain. A lumbar spine X-ray 
was read as normal. Medication was prescribed and the applicant 
was advised to remain off work until March 17, 1993. She was 
advised to follow-up with an orthopedist if she was not improved in 
4 days time. However, the applicant apparently decided to see a 
chiropractor the next day, March 12, 1993. An office note of Dr. 
C Kesler, D.C indicates that on March 12, 1993, the applicant 
needed the assistance of her son-in-law in order to walk, but was 
able to walk on her own by March 15, 1993. The applicant had 
approximately 8 chiropractic treatments by Dr. Kesler, for low back 
pain and left leg pain, between March 12, 1993 and March 31, 1993. 
The applicant was released by Dr. Kesler to return to work on March 
29, 1993 and the applicant apparently did return to work at that 
time, continuing with chiropractic treatments in April 1993. In 
April 1993, the applicant had just 5 treatments by Dr. Kesler. 
On May 5, 1993, Dr. Kesler referred the applicant to Salt 
Lake MRI Services for an MRI of the lumbar spine. The MRI was read 
to show a degenerated disc at L4-5, with a small herniation and 
mild disc bulge, degenerated discs a L5-S1 and L3-4 with no 
herniations and Tll-12 and T12-L1 degenerated discs with disc 
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bulges. The applicant had chiropractic treatments in May 1993 and 
also was seen on May 11, 1993 by an orthopedist, Dr. S. Coleman, 
and a neurologist, Dr. P. Bray, at the request of the carrier. Dr. 
Bray's report indicates that he understood that the applicant was 
reaching for something and twisting on March 11, 1993 when she 
experienced left low back pain. He noted that she had been wearing 
a back brace and felt that the chiropractic treatments had improved 
her pain 50%. The applicant stated at hearing that the 
chiropractic treatments seemed only to help during the treatment. 
Dr. Bray noted possible osteoporosis on an X-ray and found no 
evidence of neurological compromise. His impression was that the 
applicant had been having back pain over a period of years, with it 
getting worse during the past year. He concluded that the March 
11, 1993 injury was a doubtful source of her then current symptoms 
and he found that the osteoporosis could be the cause of her 
symptoms. He recommended hormone therapy for the osteoporosis, 
considering that the applicant had had her ovaries removed. 
Dr. Coleman, the orthopedist who saw the applicant on May 
11, 1993, also noted on and off back pain for one full year. He 
found that the X-rays did show modest degrees of 
osteoporosis/osteopenia with some loss of disc space at T12-L1. He 
found that both of these were surely "ancient findings." He found 
that it would be highly speculative to conclude that the March 1992 
and March 1993 episodes were causing the degree of persisting back 
pain that the applicant described. Dr. Coleman concluded that the 
applicant did not need further treatment and would reach maximum 
medical improvement without treatment in 2-3 months. He concluded 
that she was suffering from a combination of: 1) osteoporosis, 2) 
possible old healed compression fractures and 3) common mildly 
herniated discs that everyone has at a certain age. 
The applicant discontinued work on May 19, 1993 (because she 
couldn't stand the pain any more per her hearing testimony) and 
continued with chiropractic care through July 10, 1993. Per Dr. 
Kesler's records, the applicant had 16 treatments between May 17, 
1993 and July 20, 1993. On May 21, 1993, he prepared a note for 
the applicant that indicates that she was totally disabled. The 
note does not specify a time period for the disability. Dr. Kesler 
referred the applicant to Dr. W. Muir at the Intermountain Spine 
Institute for a second opinion in September 1993. In his letter 
referring her over to Dr. Muir, Dr. Kesler indicates that the 
applicant was injured pursuant to a rapid sudden jerking movement 
on March 11, 1993 in which she was trying to prevent a menu from 
falling off a counter. He notes in his September 13, 1993 letter 
to Dr. Muir that it was his opinion that the applicant's complaints 
were related to the March 11, 1993 and were not soley the result of 
her pre-existing conditions of osteoporosis and degeneration that 
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were noted by Dr. Bray and Dr. Coleman. Dr. Muir's September 14, 
1993 report indicates that he found no significant impingement of 
the thecal sac or nerve roots in the bottom 3 lumbar degenerated 
discs. His impression was: multi-level degenerated discs with 
possible instability and associated pain. He noted that he found 
the applicant's symptoms to be out of proportion to her findings 
and therefore questioned the existence of psychogenic or economic 
factors effecting the lack of improvement. He recommended a 
psychological evaluation and then possibly a discogram thereafter 
depending on the results of the psychological evaluation. 
On December 16, 1993, Dr. Kesler, D.C. prepared a Summary 
of Medical Record form inidcating that the applicant was still not 
released for work at that time. He notes on the form that the 
applicant had an L4-5 disc herniation related to the March 11, 1993 
injury and that the applicant might need additional treatment. He 
indicates on the form that he felt that the applicant had an 11% 
whole person impairment, with no aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition. 
On February 16, 1994, Dr. J. McGlothlin, saw the applicant 
after her family physician, Dr. R. Stubbs, referred her over to 
him. The applicant indicated at hearing that Dr. Stubbs had been 
prescribing pain medication for her back pain. In addition, Dr. 
Stubbs had been seeing the applicant for chest pain and shoulder 
pain since May 1993 and had been monitoring her blood pressure. 
Dr. McGlothlin was unable to come to any definitive conclusions 
without further testing, but he noted the following diagnoses: low 
back syndrome consisting of 1) lumbosacral musculoligamentous 
sprain/strain syndrome, chronic, 2) probable left sacroiliac joint 
sprain/strain syndrome, chronic, 3) L4-5 and L5-S1 disc 
degeneration with mild disc bulging and grade I-II bulge at L4-5 
and 4) no evidence of radiculopathy or lower extremity 
mononeuropathy. Dr. McGlothlin indicated that he wanted to see the 
actual MRI film, a hip X-ray and an EMG to help him rule out left 
hip degenerative arthropathy, symptom magnification and adjustment 
reaction. No further follow-up with Mr. McGlothlin occurred. 
On April 6, 1994, Dr. Kesler, D.C. completed another Summary 
of Medical Record form. This form indicates that the applicant was 
off work from March 12, 1993 to April 6, 1994 with no prediction as 
to when the applicant would reach a final state of recovery. He 
noted only that the applicant was unchanged from Februrary 14, 
1994. The form indicates a 10% whole person impairment with the 
industrial accident apparently causing the L4-5 disc herniation. 
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At the bottom of the form, he indicates that the applicant had 
asymptomatic osteoporosis and a disc herniation (level unspecified) 
prior to the March 11, 1993 injury. 
On June 17, 1994, Dr. T. Grange of WORKMED examined the 
applicant at the request of th€» carrier. Dr. Grange noted that the 
applicant had been receiving Social Security Disability since June 
of 1993. He indicates that his understanding of the incident on 
March 11, 1993 was that the applicant reached 25° to the right for 
a falling menu that was about 2 feet away. He noted that the 
applicant at that time needed to lie down about 3/4 of the day and 
drove only short distances occasionally. He noted that the 
applicant had her daughter do her grocery shopping and that she 
only occasionally tried to prepare a meal. Dr. Grange's impression 
was that the applicant had chronic low back pain that was 
multifactorial in nature. He noted that the applicant perceived 
that the March 11, 1993 incident was responsible for markedly 
limiting her activity and for causing her constant severe low back 
pain. Dr. Grange found that the applicant's symptom course was 
markedly unusual considering the "low energy mechamism of the 
injury." He noted that one would have expected a quick resolution 
and return to work after the isolated incident on March 11, 1993, 
especially considering that the applicant had a fairly light duty 
job. He found that there were objective findings for significant 
psychosocial overlay and pain magnification. 
Dr. Grange notes other diagnoses to be: 1) pre-existing 
degenerative disc disease of the thoracic and lumbar spine, 2) L4-5 
small disc herniation which was not significant neurologically (Dr. 
Grange noted that it was impossible to know whether this herniation 
existed prior to March 11, 1993, but found that it would not have 
been uncommon for it to have been present independent of the March 
11, 1993 incident), 3) moderate kyphosis, thoracolumbar scoliosis 
and osteoporosis of long-standing nature, 4) heart disease with 
bypass and chronic anti-coagulation therapy, 5) COPD with history 
of remote smoking, 6) delayed recovery and delayed return to work. 
Dr. Grange explained that the applicant's inability to exercise due 
to her heart condition complicated her recovery from the back pain. 
He found that surgery was not recommended and that counseling and 
pain management was recommended. He noted that he found that the 
March 11, 1993 incident was an ordinary routine activity and that 
there was no direct relationship between the industrial event and 
her current medical conditions. He found that the applicant was 
stable at that time, both from a neurological and a musculoskeletal 
standpoint. He rated the applicant as having 5% whole person 
impairment for her lumbar spine, all related to pre-existing 
conditions, with no impairment associated with the March 11, 1993 
incident. 
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Donald E. Bloswick, Ph.D., of Industrial Ergonomics 
Incorporated, was asked to offer an opinion/analysis of the 
exertive force involved in the applicant's March 11, 1993 
industrial event as compared to changing a tire or lifting a small 
child, activities noted in the Allen case cited above as not 
involving unusual exertion. Bloswick concluded from watching a 
video tape showing the nature of the applicant/s reach on March 11, 
1993 that the industrial incident involved a compressive force of 
504 pounds. Compressive forces on the low back for lifting a small 
child and lifting a tire were listed as ranging from 604 pounds to 
1155 pounds. Per this information, Bloswick concluded that the low 
back stresses experienced by the applicant in "reaching for the 
menu" were less than the low back stress occasioned by lifting a 
small child or lifting a tire. 
In closing argument, counsel for the defendants argued that 
Bloswick/s analysis shows that, on March 11, 1993, the applicant 
was not involved in "unusual exertion" beyond what is experienced 
by 20th century individuals in their non-employment lives, as this 
is defined in the Allen case. Per counsel for the defedants, this, 
in combination with the applicant's contributory pre-existing 
condition, makes the applicant's March 11, 1993 incident non-
compensable. Counsel for the applicant counters that Bloswick was 
analyzing merely a reach for a menu card, and not a sudden lunge 
with a twist as the applicant described her work injury. As such, 
counsel for the applicant argues that Bloswick's conclusions do not 
assist in making a determination regarding the "usualness" of the 
applicant's exertion on March 11, 1993. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ finds that the applicant's industrial incident on 
March 11, 1993 occurred as she described it at hearing, i.e. as 
involving a sudden lunge with a twist to right. There has been no 
evidence presented indicating that the incident was merely a 2-foot 
reach to the right as the defendants have described the incident to 
their chosen examining physicians and experts. The mere fact that 
the applicant was attempting to catch a falling object suggests 
that her actions were sudden and the fact that she needed to get 
her arm around the cash register and over the counter suggest that 
a significant reach/lunge was necessary. The ALJ finds that this 
kind of twisting lunge is not normally a part of everday non-
employment life in the 20th century, as it is described in the 
Allen case cited above, and finds that this activity is 
sufficiently "unusual" to meet the additional risk/causation factor 
that the Allen case finds is necessary for compensability where 
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there is a contributory pre-existing condition. The ALJ also 
agrees with counsel for the applicant that the Bloswick analysis of 
compressive force is not supportive of the defendants' position in 
this matter, simply because Bloswick did not analyze the activity 
that was truly invovled on March 11, 1993. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the ALJ finds that the 
applicant has established unusual exertion on the date of injury 
and thereby has established the legal cause element of 
compensability. However, the compensability analysis also requires 
a finding of medical cause and the ALJ finds that the evidence with 
respect to medical cause at this point is very unclear. All the 
doctors concede the existence of one or more contributory pre-
existing conditions in the spine. The evidence as a whole seems to 
suggest that some kind of aggravation or "lighting up" of symptoms 
occurred as a result of the March 11, 1993 incident. However, it 
is unclear from the evidence in the medical record exhibit whether 
the applicant has stabilized from the effects of the incident and 
when she did stabilize from the incident if she has in fact already 
stablized. There also appears to be medical controversy with 
respect to whether or not any permanent impairment occurred as a 
result of the industrial incident on March 11, 1993. These medical 
factors need to be resolved before it can be determined whether 
benefits are due the applicant and in what amount. Considering the 
fact that the examining/treating physicians differ with respect to 
these issues, the ALJ feels a medical panel referral is 
appropriate. 
The ALJ will therefore direct the applicant's attorney to 
arrange to have the inital X-ray films taken at St. Mark's Hospital 
and the MRI flim taken at Salt Lake MRI referred to the ALJ so that 
a medical panel referral can be accomplished. Any Motions for 
Review based on the findings and conclusions stated in this Interim 
Order should be withheld and filed after the ALJ has issued her 
final order in this matter. Those Motions for Review will be 
considered timely filed if filed with the ALJ within 3 0 days of the 
final order. 
INTERIM ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's attorney 
arrange to have the relevant X-ray films referred to the ALJ so 
that a medical panel referral can be accomplished. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a final ruling will be issued 
once the medical panel referral is accomplished and that any 
objections or requests for review of the interim rulings noted in 
this order will be considered timely if filed within 30 days of the 
final ALJ order in this matter. 
DATED this [j day of August, 1994. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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Case No. 94 
* 
MAY BIGLER, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
TW SERVICES/TRANSPORTATION * 
INSURANCE, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BEFORE: Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was represented by Phillip Shell, 
Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney. 
On August 17, 1994, the ALJ issued Interim Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order in the above-referenced matter. That 
Interim Order deals with only one issue, legal cause, and resolves 
that issue only. This final order resolves the remaining issues 
involved in this case. 
In their answer to the applicant's application for hearing, 
the defendants specified that the applicant was not entitled to 
benefits related to the March 11, 1993 work incident at issue, 
because she did not sustain a compensable work accident at that 
time. The defendants argued that the applicant could show neither 
medical nor legal cause, both of which must be established for 
compensability, per Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 
(Utah 1986). Because all evidence pertinent to the legal cause 
issue was before the ALJ at the completion of the hearing on August 
8, 1994, the ALJ decided to issue an interim ruling on that issue 
alone, as resolution of that issue could have resulted in no 
further need for litigation. After reviewing the medical records 
and the applicant's hearing testimony, the ALJ concluded that the 
applicant had met her burden of showing "unusual exertion," so as 
to establish legal cause. The Interim Order fully discusses the 
ALJ's findings and reasons for so concluding. In the Interim 
Order, after explaining her reasons for ruling in the applicant's 
favor on the legal cause issue, the ALJ noted that the medical 
causal element of compensability still required resolution. 
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Because the ALJ found that the medical records contained some lack 
of clarity on the medical causal connection between the work 
incident and subsequent symptoms and treatment, the ALJ indicated 
she would refer the medical cause issue to a medical panel for 
additional input on that issue. 
After collection of X-rays, the matter was referred over to 
the medical panel on October 19, 1994. The medical panel report 
was received at the Commission on December 21, 1994 and was 
distributed to the parties on December 22, 1994, with 15 days 
allowed for filing objections. The ALJ granted the defendants' 
request for an extension of time to file objections to the medical 
panel report. The defendants' objections were filed on January 24, 
1995. The applicant responded to the objections on February 7, 
1995 and the defendants filed a reply to the applicant's response 
on February 22, 1995. The matter was considered ready for order on 
February 7, 1995, but the ALJ is considering all evidence and 
argument submitted to date, in making her final decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
For purpose of factual findings related to the issue of 
medical cause, the ALJ hereby incorporates the Findings of Fact 
specified in the August 17, 1994 Interim Order. 
The medical panel consisted of chairman, Dr. M. Thomas, a 
neurologist, panelmember, Dr. A. 0. Smoot, an orthopedist, and 
panelmember, Dr. R. Burgoyne, a psychiatrist. The medical panel 
was requested to answer questions dealing with: the medical causal 
connection between the March 11, 1993 industrial event and the 
applicant's back problems, the date the applicant stabilized from 
the effects of the March 11, 1993 accident, permanent impairment 
pre-existing the accident and caused by the accident, and what 
treatment was/will be necessary as a result of the accident. The 
panel concluded that there was a medical causal connection between 
the March 11, 1994 work incident and applicant's current back 
problems. The panel commented: "the panel is impressed that 
something significant occurred at the time of the accident, which 
led to her immediate symptoms, which have persisted over time since 
then." The panel concluded that the applicant was stable in April 
of 1994, as it appeared that her condition has remained the same 
since that time. With respect to impairment, the panel found that 
the applicant had an overall 5% whole person impairment to the low 
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back, with 1.7% whole person attributable to the March 11, 1993 
accident and 3.3% whole person attributable to pre-existing 
conditions. In addition, the panel found that the applicant had a 
5% whole person impairment for somatoform pain disorder. Past 
medical care was found to be related to the March 11, 1993 
industrial accident. Infrequent orthopedic follow-up, and possibly 
attendance at a pain clinic, were recommended as future treatment. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT: 
The basic premise of counsel for the defendants' Objections 
to the Medical Panel Report is that the ALJ improperly influenced 
the panel's decision on medical cause, by discussing her reasons 
for ruling in favor of the applicant on the legal cause issue in 
the Interim Order. Counsel argues that the ALJ's discussion in the 
Interim Order regarding the reliability/applicability of the 
analyses made by Dr. Grange and Dr. Bloswick, resulted in the panel 
being influenced to discount the opinions of Dr. Grange and Dr. 
Bloswick. Per counsel, the ALJ improperly concluded that Dr. 
Bloswick and Dr. Grange had relied on inaccurate information 
regarding the nature of the applicant's activities on March 11, 
1993. Counsel argues that Dr. Grange and Dr. Bloswick had the same 
information regarding what occurred on that date as was provided at 
hearing and thus their opinions regarding the exertion required on 
March 11, 1993, and Dr. Grange's opinion regarding the lack of a 
medical causal connection between the work incident and the 
subsequent symptoms/treatment, are valid reliable opinions. 
Counsel apparently argues that if the ALJ had so concluded, the 
panel would have given more credit to the opinions of Dr. Grange 
and Dr. Bloswick and would not have been influenced to discount 
their opinions, as did the ALJ. Presumably, counsel argues that 
had the panel given more credit to the opinions of Dr. Grange and 
Dr. Bloswick, the panel would have found no medical causal 
connection between the industrial accident and the subsequent 
developing back symptoms. 
Counsel for the applicant responds to the above argument, 
noting first that Dr. Grange and Dr. Bloswick both describe the 
applicant's activity on the date of injury as involving merely a 
"reach.'1 Counsel states that, even if the deposition transcript 
indicating a lunge and a jerk was provided to the doctors, neither 
doctor seemed to take careful note of the lunge/jerk testimony and 
rather analyzed the relevant activity as involving merely a reach* 
Counsel argues that this reference to merely a reach is more in 
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line with what counsel for the defendants states in his cover 
letter to the doctors than it is with what the applicant stated at 
her deposition and her hearing. With respect to the defendants, 
argument that the ALJ's discounting of the opinions of Dr. Bloswick 
and Dr. Grange caused the panel to also discount those opinions, 
counsel argues that the panel had the full reports of Dr. Bloswick 
and Dr. Grange and there is nothing to in the panel report to 
indicate that they wholly discounted those reports. 
Counsel for the defendants' reply to counsel for the 
applicant's response states that the ALJ incorrectly emphasized the 
unusualness of the activity engaged in by the applicant on the date 
of injury, as opposed to the unusualness of the exertion engaged in 
at that time. Counsel argues that, had the ALJ correctly focused 
on the unusualness of the exertion, she would have found Dr. 
Bloswick's compressive force analysis to be directly on point, 
instead of having discounted it (and to follow the argument 
through, the ALJ presumes that counsel contends that this in turn 
would have caused the panel to give more credit to the Bloswick 
compressive force analysis). With respect to the work activity 
facts used by Bloswick in making his analysis, counsel argues that 
Bloswick's report recounts facts and information not in counsel's 
cover letter to Bloswick, and thus this shows that Bloswick had the 
applicant's testimony (i.e. lunge and jerk) in mind when he did his 
analysis, and not merely counsel's indication of mere reaching. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ adopts the findings of the medical panel on the 
issue of the medical causal connection between the March 11, 1993 
work incident and the subsequent developing back problems, 
treatment and related impairment. The ALJ does so primarily 
because there are no other well-founded medical opinions that 
directly controvert the findings of the medical panel on the 
medical causal issue. Dr. Grange does conclude that he felt the 
applicant's symptom course was an unusual one to follow such a 
"low-energy mechanism" as that involved in the industrial accident. 
However, as has been discussed in the Interim Order, it does not 
appear that Dr. Grange had accurate facts to rely on in making his 
assessment of what was involved on the date of injury. In the only 
place in his report where he describes the industrial event, he 
quotes directly from counsel for the defendants cover letter which 
indicates that the industrial incident involved a mere reaching 25° 
to the right. The ALJ would also consider this description to be 
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a "low-energy" activity, but this description is not what the 
applicant described in her deposition and her hearing testimony and 
it is not what the ALJ found was involved on the date of injury. 
Based on his statements in his June 17, 1994 report, Dr. Grange was 
analyzing an activity that counsel for the defendant described to 
him and was not basing his analysis on the actual facts of the 
relevant activity, even if he had the actual facts provided to him 
by way of the applicant's deposition transcript. Just because Dr. 
Grange was given the applicant's deposition transcript, doesn't 
mean he read it or relied upon it. It appears evident from his 
report that he probably did not. Therefore, considering Dr. 
Grange's conclusions are based on an activity that is different 
from what the ALJ has found actually occurred, the ALJ finds that 
his report is not well-founded and therefore does not conflict with 
the panel report (which analyzes the correct facts as specified in 
the ALJ's Interim Order). 
The ALJ should note that she finds no other medical 
opinions, besides that of Dr. Grange, that can be interpreted to 
conflict with the medical panel's causal anlysis. Dr. Coleman did 
indicate that he did not feel that all of the applicant's symptoms 
were related to the industrial injuries alone, but he did not 
exclude any causal connection with the March 11, 1993 incident. 
His opinion is not in conflict with the panel conclusions, as the 
panel notes that the applicant does have significant pre-existing 
impairment to the low back and thus not all of her problems are 
solely related to the industrial injury. Based on the lack of any 
medical opinions truly conflicting with that of the panel, and 
based on the fact that the panel has provided a thorough, well-
informed and logical causal analysis, the ALJ finds the panel 
conclusions should be adopted. 
With respect to the objections to the medical panel report, 
the ALJ does not agree that the panel has been improperly 
influenced in any way by an unrelated finding made by the ALJ or by 
the ALJ's discussion of her reasoning behind the unrelated finding. 
The panel was specifically instructed to deal just with the issue 
of medical cause and the panel was given all the relevant medical 
evidence and other expert opinion that was offered at the hearing 
to consider in making its analysis. The ALJ specifically directed 
the panel to rely on the facts stated in the Interim Order and 
there is nothing in the panel report that indicates to the ALJ that 
the panel was relying on anything but the facts stated in the ALJ's 
Interim Order. The ALJ finds it purely speculative to suggest that 
the panel was unduely influenced by the ALJ's discounting of the 
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opinions of Dr. Bloswick and Dr. Grange. The panel had the full 
reports of those doctors and the ALJ knows of no reason why the 
panel would be more influenced by something the ALJ indicated as 
opposed to something that one of their own medical colleagues 
stated. In actuality, the ALJ believes that most medical panels 
base their decisions on their own expert analysis and are not 
unduly influenced by the opinions or statements of any one 
physician or other individual. 
With respect to the argument that the ALJ analyzed the 
unusualness of the activity as opposed to the unusualness.of the 
exertion, the ALJ should clarify that she did in fact consider the 
sudden twisting lunge on the date of injury to involve unusual 
exertion. The Interim Order does state this conclusion in terms of 
the activity being unusual, but the ALJ was focusing on the 
exertion involved in the activity when she made her conclusions. 
The ALJ should note that she does find that the type of evidence 
supplied by Dr. Bloswick (i.e. the compressive force analysis) can 
be very helpful in analyzing the "unusal exertion" requirement for 
legal cause. It can be difficult at times to compare exertion 
levels, as is required by Allen unusual exertion test. Expert 
analysis in this area is very helpful, provided the expert is 
analyzing the correct activity. In the instant case, the ALJ finds 
that the expert was analyzing an activity suggested to him by 
counsel and not the activity that was actually involved. In future 
cases, the ALJ would certainly accept well-founded compressive 
force analysis evidence and might even welcome this additional 
evidence. 
Based on the medical panel conclusions, the applicant has 
established medical cause. Legal cause was found established in 
the Interim Order. Medical and legal cause established, the ALJ 
finds that the applicant sustained a compensable industrial 
accident on March 11, 1993. Benefits are thus payable per the 
medical panel conclusions regarding stability and permanent 
impairment. 
Per the panel report, the applicant is entitled to temporary 
total compensation (TTC) for the periods off work from the date of 
injury until April 1994, when the applicant stabilized per the 
medical panel. The ALJ finds that Dr. Kesler's records indicate a 
need to be off work until April 6, 1994 and thus the ALJ will use 
that date in April for the end of TTC. Per the ALJ's Interim 
Order, the applicant worked between March 29, 1993 and May 19, 1993 
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and thus the periods of TTC to be awarded are from March 12, 1993 
through March 28, 1993 (2.429 weeks) and May 19, 1993 through April 
5, 1994 (46 weeks) . Her average weekly wage, per her 
representations on the application for hearing (that have not been 
specifcially denied), is based on 35 hours/week at $5.20/hour, or 
$182.00/week. The compensation rate is thus $121.00/week ($182.00 
x .667 = $121.39) when rounded off as reguired by U.C.A. 35-1-75. 
The total TTC award is therefore $5,859.91 ($121.00 x 48.429). 
Permanent impairment benefits (PPI) are based on a total of 6*7% 
whole person impairment (5% for the somatoform pain disorder and 
1.7% for the permanent aggravation to the low back caused by the 
March 11, 1993 accident). The PPI award is thus 20.9 weeks (312 
weeks x .067) at $121.00/week, or $2,528.90. Attorney fees are 
based on 20% of the full award of compensation, per R568-1-7, and 
amount to $8,388.81 ($5,859.91 for TTC + $2,528.90 for PPI) x.20, 
or $1,677.76. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, T. W. Services 
and/or Transportation Insurance, pay the applicant, May Bigler, 
temporary total compensation at the rate of $121.00 per week, for 
48.429 weeks, or a total of $5,859.91, for the periods of medical 
instability associated with the March 11, 1993 industrial accident 
from March 11, 1993 through March 28, 1993 and from May 19, 1993 
through April 5, 1994. That amount is accrued and due and payable 
in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, 
and less the attorney fees to be awarded below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, T. W. Services 
and/or Transportation Insurance, pay the applicant, May Bigler, 
permanent impairment benefits at the rate of $121.00 per week, for 
20.9 weeks, or a total of $2,528.90, for the 6.7% whole person 
impairment sustained as a result of the March 11, 1993 industrial 
accident. That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump 
sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, T. W. Services 
and/or Transportation Insurance, pay all medical expenses incurred 
as the result of the March 11, 1993 industrial accident as 
specified by the medical panel appointed in this matter; said 
expenses to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee 
schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, T. W. Services 
and/or Transportation Insurance, pay Phillip Shell, attorney for 
the applicant, the sum of $1,677.76, plus 20% of the interest 
payable on the applicant's award, per R568-1-7, for services 
rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid 
award to the applicant, and to be remitted directly to the office 
of Phillip Shell. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2) Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this^P^/ day of March, 1995. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
MAY BIGLER, * 
Applicant, * ORDER GRANTING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
vs. * 
T. W. SERVICES, INC. and * Case No. 94-0273 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO. * 
Defendants. * 
T. W. Services, Inc. and its workers' compensation insurance 
carrier, Transportation Insurance Co. (referred to jointly as "T. 
W. Services" hereafter) ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review the Administrative Lawr Judge's award of benefits to May 
Bigler pursuant to the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW 
Has Ms. Bigler established that her accident of March 11, 1993 
is the legal cause of the injuries for which she seeks workers' 
compensation benefits. Because the Industrial Commission finds 
this issue dispositive, it does not address other issues raised in 
T. W. Services' motion for review. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Because the parties agree that Ms. Bigler suffered a 
preexisting back conditions that required her to meet the 
higherstandard of legal causation announced in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), it is unnecessary to detail 
the nature and extent of such preexisting conditions, which are 
documented in the medical record. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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As to the accident of March 11, 1993, the Industrial 
Commission adopts the ALJ's finding, which can be summarized as 
follows: Ms. Bigler worked as a cashier in*a cafeteria, standing 
behind a cash register located between two waist-high counters. A 
copy of the daily menu was held in a light-weight plastic stand in 
front of the cash register, approximately two feet away from Ms. 
Bigler. , I 
At the time of the accident, Ms. Bigler saw the menu begin to 
fall. She twisting 25 degrees to the right and lunged forward 
across the counter in an unsuccessful attempt to catch the menu. 
As she did so, she felt a sharp pain in her low back. Ms. Bigler 
now seeks workers7 compensation benefits for this injury. 
PISCVSSZQN AflD CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 35-1-45 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides 
benefits for workers injured by accident arising out of and in the 
course of their employment. A person suffering from a preexisting 
condition is not necessarily disqualified from receiving workers' 
compensation benefits. However, in order to establish that the 
injury arises out of and' in the course of employment, "a claimant 
with a preexisting condition must show that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced in everyday life because of his condition." Allen, 729 P.2d 
at 25. This requirement, referred to as "legal causation", is met 
when the claimant demonstrates some exertion greater than that 
experienced in typical, modern nonemployment life. Allen, 72 9 P. 2d 
at 26. 
I I 
i 
The Industrial Commission has carefully considered the nature 
of Ms. Bigler's exertion on March 11, 1993. The Industrial 
Commission notes that, not infrequently, objects fall from tables, 
desks, countertops and shelves. Consequently, it is not unusual 
for persons to make sudden twisting and lunging movements to 
attempt to catch such objects. Ms. Bigler's similar activity at 
work on March 11, 1993 was not atypical of risks generally faced 
everyday in nonemployment life. I 
Based on the foregoing, the Industrial Commission finds Ms. 
Bigler has failed to establish that her accident while employed at 
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T. W. Services meets the higher test for legal causation required 
by Allen. The Industrial Commission therefore concludes that Ms. 
Bigler's injury is not compensable under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
In light of the Industrial Commission's determination that Ms. 
Bigler has failed to establish legal causation, it is unnecessary 
to address other issues raised in T. W. Services' motion for 
review. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission hereby grants T. W. Services' motion 
for review and reverses the ALJ's award of benefits to Ms. Bigler. 
The Industrial Commission denies Ms. Bigler's claim for workers' 
compensation benefits on the grounds her injury did not arise out 
of her employment at T. W. Services. It is so ordered. 
Dated this ^  ^ day of September, 1995. 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS. 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
Order by filing a. request for reconsideration with the Industrial 
Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0 
days of the date of this Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion 
For Review in the matter of May Bigler, Case No. 94-02 73, was 
mailed first class postage prepaid this J2 f day of September, 1995, 
to the following: 
MAY BIGLER 
3 810 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD #204 9 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84119 
MICHAEL DYER, ATTORNEY 
77 WEST 200 SOUTH #400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
PHILLIP SHELL, ATTORNEY 
4 5 EAST VINE STREET 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
"Me 11 Butler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
orders\94-0273 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ORDER EXTENDING TIME 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 94-0273 
On October 18, 1995, May Bigler filed a Motion For 
Reconsideration in the above entitled matter. Under §63-46b-13 of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, such a motion is deemed 
denied unless the Commission issues its Order within 20 days. 
However, pursuant to §63-46b-l(9) of the Act, the Commission may 
extend, for good cause, the 20 day period. 
To allow other parties to respond to Mrs. Bigler's Motion and 
to allow the Industrial Commission of Utah sufficient time to 
properly consider the matter, the period for determination of 
Mrs. Bigler1s Motion For Reconsideration is hereby extended as 
follows: 
1. Other parties may respond to the Motion in writing no 
later than November 17, 1995. 
MAY BIGLER, * 
* 
Applicant/ * 
* 
T. W. SERVICES, INC. and * 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO. * 
* 
Defendants. * 
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2. The Commission will issue its decision on the Motion no 
later than December 8, 1995. 
DATED this 3&£- day of November, 1995. 
frflDuu. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
/^ r^ t^ sg^ ^/^r^^^r^ _ 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
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was mailed first class postage prepaid this ? ^ ^ day of November 
1995, to the following: 
MAY BIGLER 
3810 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD #2049 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84119 
MICHAEL DYER, ATTORNEY 
77 WEST 200 SOUTH #400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
PHILLIP SHELL, ATTORNEY 
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/ 
Phylli^/ Olson 
Support Specialist 
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